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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
HENRY S. BRUCE, JR. 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 860325 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment against Henry Bruce for 
aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §76-6-302 (1953 as amended). A jury found him guilty following 
a trial on April 24-29, 1986, in the Third District Court, in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Leonard H. 
Russon, Judge presiding. Mr. Bruce was committed to the Utah State 
Prison for the indeterminate term of five years to life. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On November 26, 1985 at approximately 3:00 in the 
afternoon, the Corner Mart gas and convenience store on Tenth North 
and 950 West in Salt Lake City received a phone call. The caller, a 
male voice, told the employee, Sue Ann Candelaria, that he had a gun 
pointed at her; she was then instructed to put all the money in a 
bag and give it to a man who would be entering the store or the 
caller would shoot at her (R. 308). A few minutes later a black man 
entered the store, placed his hand under his jacket, pointed his 
finger like a gun, and told the employee to "do what the man on the 
phone said" (R. 307-09). 
The employee gave the man the money, two hundred and 
fourteen dollars (R. 340-41). The man then exited the Corner Mart/ 
turned the corner/ and headed north on foot (R. 385-86). Ruthie K. 
Barton, the sister of Sue Ann Candelariaf was visiting her sister at 
the Corner Mart at the time of the robbery. Both sisters testified 
that they observed the robber appear to stick the money into the 
front of h.is pants as he ran away (R. 312-13/ 492). Ms. Barton 
followed the robber at a distance of about twenty-five to thirty 
feet (R. 354-55). Ms. Barton testified that she observed the robber 
cross the street and enter a walkway betv/een two apartment buildings 
(R. 355-56). She testified that after crossing the street behind 
the robber/ she walked through the nearby parking lot; she said that 
she did not see the robber again (R. 357). Ms. Barton testified 
that she did see an orange car, a station wagon, drive away from the 
apartment parking lot (R. 357-58). Her testimony was very clear, 
however, that she did not see anyone get in the car, nor could she 
see any of the occupants of the car (R. 357, 386-87). 
Ms. Barton then testified that she returned to the Corner 
Mart and told police officers, who arrived within minutes, what had 
occurred (R. 360-61). An all-channel police broadcast was then 
disseminated by the police officers (R. 162). That broadcast stated 
that an armed robbery had occurred and for all officers to "be on 
alert for a suspicious-type car, . . . an orange Volkswagen, small 
four-door sedan or Volkswagen" (R. 163, 172). The broadcast also 
indicated that two black males were in the front seat of that 
vehicle (R. 163, 172). Police Officer Hill heard that broadcast and 
drove toward the direction of the robbery (R. 163). He soon 
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observed an orange datsun four-door sedan or stationwagon with two 
black males in the front seat (R. 164). 
Officer Hill followed this car for about three blocks and 
at one point "observed action in the front seat" (R. 165). He 
described the action as "people moving and it seemed like one of the 
two occupants/ the passenger occupant in that vehicle, had placed a 
coat or something in the back seat, which naturally being a 
policeman, alerted me to the fact that something was going on" (R. 
165). On cross-examination he clarified his testimony stating that 
the passenger had nothing in his hand and only turned his body 
toward the back seat looking into it or reaching into it and then 
exchanged words with the driver (R. 173-74). At no point, however, 
did the vehicle increase speed (R. 173-74). He then notified the 
dispatcher that he was going to apprehend or pull over the car (R. 
165). Officer Hill testified that he made the stop because in his 
mind the passengers were "possible armed robbery suspects" (R. 174). 
Officer Hill pulled the car over using a "high intensity 
stop", ordered them out of the car, and with his gun drawn 
instructed the men to place their hands on top of the car (R. 
166-68). A number of other officers then arrived, frisked the 
suspects, and continued the investigation (R. 169-70). Mr. Bruce, 
the passenger, and Mr. Latham, the driver, were detained until a 
witness arrived to make an identification (R. 431). 
Another broadcast was then made back to the Corner Mart 
informing the officers there that a suspect vehicle had been stopped 
and an inquiry was made whether a witness could come to identify the 
vehicle and suspects (R. 361). Ms. Barton overheard the broadcast 
and indicated a desire to go with the officers to make the 
identification (R. 208). She accompanied a police officer to the 
location where the vehicle had been stopped and immediately 
identified it as the car that had left the apartment complex (R. 
361-62). She then identified both black men with the police 
officers. She identified one as the robber of the store and the 
other as a man who had been in the store the prior evening inquiring 
about the phone number (R. 363-66). The identification of Mr. Bruce 
as the robber of the Corner Mart was made solely from the clothing 
he was wearing, dark corduroys and a sweat jacket (R. 388). After 
the identification of Mr. Bruce and Mr. Latham by Ms. Barton, they 
were placed under arrest (R. 444-46). Police officers then searched 
the suspects and the vehicle; they found three one dollar bills on 
the floor of the vehicle, $104.93 on Mr. Latham, and $101.00 tucked 
into the front of Mr. Bruce's pants (R. 431-34). 
Prior to trial, counsel for defendant made several 
motions. She moved for the evidence of the eyewitness 
identification of Ms.Barton to be excluded because of the suggestive 
nature of the process employed (R. 275-76). That motion was denied 
by the trial court (R. 283). A motion was also made to prevent the 
state from impeaching the testimony of Mr. Bruce by introducing 
evidence of prior convictions (R. 230-32). That motion was also 
denied by the trial court (R. 290-91). Also, a motion was made to 
exclude all evidence obtained from the arrest scene as it was the 
fruits of a constitutionally invalid stop (R. 216-26). That motion 
was also denied (R. 227-28). 
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A police lineup of Mr. Bruce and seven others was conducted 
wherein Sue Ann Candelaria, her sister Ruthie K. Barton, and Janine 
Dempsey, a salesperson from the nearby Self's Food Store, 
participated. None of them picked Mr. Bruce as the robber. Both 
Ms. Candelaria and Ms. Barton selected the same other individual 
from the lineup as the one who had robbed the Corner Mart (R. 316, 
405-07). Ms. Dempsey selected no one at all as she was just unsure 
(R. 469-73). 
Yet, at the preliminary hearing, both of the sisters picked 
Mr. Bruce as the robber. Ms. Candelaria testified that she had 
noticed him earlier in the line-up but was told that she had picked 
the wrong man (R. 337, 346). Regarding the identification of Mr. 
Bruce as the robber, Ms. Candelaria, during the preliminary hearing, 
stated, "You know what you are suppose to do. It has been two 
months. I don't know what he looks like. He did it, so what is the 
big deal?" (R. 339). Ms. Barton, like her sister, was told that she 
had picked the wrong man (R. 406-07); subsequently, she identified 
Mr. Bruce at the preliminary hearing as the robber of the Corner 
Mart (R. 403). Ms. Dempsey did not participate in the preliminary 
hearing (R. 473). At trial, all three identified Mr.Bruce as the 
robber (R. 307, 349, 465). In all of these in-court 
identifications, Mr. Bruce was the only young black man in the room 
(R. 335-36). 
A fourth witness, Officer John Merrick, an employee of the 
Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office assigned to the County Jail, 
testified at trial. His testimony allegedly placed Mr. Bruce at a 
phone booth near the Corner Mart around the time of the robbery (R. 
484-86). Counsel for Mr. Bruce moved the trial court to suppress 
the testimony of Officer Merrick because his testimony was the 
product of a suggestive one-photo showup (R. 157). The trial court 
denied that motion (R. 482-83). Officer Merrick observed the men at 
the phone booth for less than two minutes from a distance of one 
hundred yards—across the width of the street and across a parking 
lot—while he was waiting for two distinct traffic lights on his way 
to and from the Seven-Eleven prior to going goose hunting (R. 
490-92). During that time the two men were moving around and he 
could only see a frontal view part of the time (R. 491). He 
testified that he recognized Otis Latham by name but did not 
recognize the other man (R. 262-65). Upon returning to work the 
following day. Officer Merrick went to the docket sheet, found the 
name of Otis Latham and saw that Henry Bruce was the person arrested 
with Latham. He then went to Mr.Bruce's arrest file, looked at the 
single photo inside and concluded that the man in the photo was the 
man at the phone booth the day before (R. 266-74, 494). Merrick 
testified, however, outside the presence of the jury during the 
motion to exclude his testimony, that he had no prior face to face 
conversations nor confrontations with Mr. Bruce; he had only seen 
him once or twice before in the halls of the County Jail (R. 272, 
493). 
After the prosecution presented its evidence, counsel for 
the Defendant made a motion to dismiss the charge of aggravated 
robbery and to reduce the charge to simple robbery (R. 497-503). 
This motion was based on the fact that no evidence of use of a 
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weapon or facsimile of a weapon was shown by the state. Evidence 
was very explicit that the witnesses had not seen a weapon and that 
they had been very aware that the robber was using his finger rather 
than a gun or facsimile of a gun (R. 309). The trial court denied 
the motion and gave both the aggravated robbery and simple robbery 
verdict forms to the jury (R. 503). 
Mr. Bruce testified in his own behalf (R. 503-24). He 
denied that he had been involved in the robbery (R. 514). He stated 
that he had been walking from the house of one friend to the house 
of another friend when Mr. Latham stopped him and offered to give 
him a ride (R. 505-06). The money he was carrying was the earnings 
from his recent employment; he carried it in his pants in the manner 
he had ever since he had once been mugged back in the ghetto of 
Kansas City where he grew up (R. 512). Mr. Bruce admitted prior 
convictions on direct examination (R. 513). The parties stipulated 
to the fact that officers dusted for and found fingerprints in the 
store on the counter and the bar across the door where the robber 
had touched; those fingerprints did not match those of the defendant 
(R. 496). 
Mr. Bruce testified that he has had a gold-capped front 
tooth, and a tattoo on his forehead from 1972 and 1969, respectively 
(R. 513). None of the witnesses used those physical characteristics 
to identify Mr. Bruce. 
Counsel for Mr. Bruce requested and profferred a cautionary 
eyewitness instruction to be given to the jury (R. 578-79). She 
based the request on the fact that eyewitness identification was at 
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issue. The trial court denied that motion and counsel for the 
Defendant took exception to that denial (R. 578-79). 
The jury returned from deliberations with a guilty verdict 
on the charge of aggravated robbery (R. 580). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
On appeal Appellant, Henry Bruce, first contends that the 
trial court should have dismissed the charge of aggravated robbery 
in favor of a charge of simple robbery. No weapon was used during 
the commission of the crime so no aggravated robbery occurred. 
Mr. Bruce alleges that evidence obtained during an illegal 
stop and arrest should have been suppressed. No probable cause 
existed nor could a reasonable suspicion be articulated to support 
the stop of the vehicle which led to Mr. Bruce's arrest. 
The Appellant asserts that evidence of his prior 
convictions should have been excluded. The trial court 
misinterpreted Rule 609 of the Utah Rules of Evidence in permitting 
introduction of the previous convictions. The prior convictions did 
not demonstrate the defendant's propensity to lie under oath but did 
prejudice the jury against the defendant,. 
Mr. Bruce contends the identification testimony of one of 
the prosecution's witnesses should have been suppressed because it 
was the result of a suggestive show-up. 
Finally, the Appellant contends that instruction regarding 
identification testimony should have been given to the jury. The 
instruction was justified in this case because of the faulty and 




THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DISMISS 
THE AGGRAVATED ROBBERY CHARGE AND TO REDUCE 
THE CHARGE TO SIMPLE ROBBERY. 
At the end of the prosecution's case, counsel for the 
defendant moved to dismiss the charge of aggravated robbery and to 
reduce the charge to simple robbery (R. 497-503). Mr. Bruce now 
contends that the trial court committed error when it denied that 
motion (R.503). 
The defense motion was based on the fact that no evidence 
was presented by the prosecution which supported the charge of 
aggravated robbery. The prosecution offered no weapon into evidence 
nor was evidence presented that one was used in the robbery. Both 
witnesses unequivocally and consistently testified that they knew 
the robber did not have a gun. Ms. Candelaria testifiedf "It [his 
hand under his jacket] just looked like a normal thingf like a gun, 
but it wasn't. I knew it wasn't." (R.309). Similarly/ her sister, 
Ms. Barton, testified, "He had his hands in his pocket like this, 
acting like he had a gun in his pocket " (R.350). 
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING THE 
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY CHARGE TO THE JURY. 
The trial court is required by statute to decide all 
questions of law. Utah Code Ann. §78-21-3 states, 
All questions of law, including the admissibility 
of evidence, the facts preliminary to such 
admission, the construction of statutes and other 
writings, and the application of the rules of 
evidence are to be decided by the court and all 
discussions of law addressed to it. Whenever the 
knowledge of the court is by law made evidence of 
a fact, the court is to declare such knowledge to 
the jury, who are bound to accept it. 
_ Q 
In the case at bar no factual dispute existed regarding whether the 
robber used a weapon. Evidence demonstrated that the robber had not 
used a weapon, therefore, the court was obligated to take from the 
jury any question regarding aggravating robbery. 
The only possible question remaining from the facts is 
whether a hand/finger, though admittedly recognized as "not a gun," 
can legally be a facsimile of a firearm as required by Utah Code 
Ann. §76-6-302. (See Addendum A.) However, case law forecloses 
this question. In State v. Turner, 572 P.2d 387 (Utah 1977), this 
Court cited with approval a decision from a New York court which 
spoke to this matter. The New York court defined the word 
imitation—held by this Court in Turner to be a synonym of 
"facsimile" —as follows: 
The word imitation when applied to pistols and 
revolvers means so nearly resembling the genuine 
as to mislead, with the apparent object of 
producing, and likely to produce, upon the minds 
of those against whom it is to be used, the 
belief that the imitation weapon, is capable of 
producing all the injurious consequences to the 
victim as the use of the genuine article itself. 
People v. Delgardo, 146 N.Y.S.2d 350, 356 (1955). Inasmuch as the 
witnesses were neither misled nor possessed a belief that the 
finger/hand was a weapon, the statutory requirement of a "weapon or 
facsimile of a weapon" could not legally be met. Accordingly, the 
trial court in the case at bar erred in denying the motion to reduce 
the charge from aggravated robbery to simple robbery. Mr. Bruce's 
conviction, therefore should be reversed and a conviction on the 
lesser charge imposed or a new trial awarded. 
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If this Court finds, however, that whether a facsimile of a 
weapon was used in the robbery is a question for the jury, then the 
jury verdict should still be overturned because the prosecution's 
evidence was insufficient to establish that a weapon or facsimile of 
a weapon was used. 
B. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS 
INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY A CONVICTION ON THE 
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY CHARGE. 
The standard this Court employs for reviewing the 
sufficiency of the evidence and reversing a jury verdict is well 
established. In State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 442, 444 (Utah 1983), 
this Court stated, "[N]ot withstanding the presumptions in favor of 
the jury's decision this Court still has the right to review the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict." Further, the 
Court noted: 
We reverse a jury conviction for insufficient 
evidence only when the evidence is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 
crime for which he was convicted. 
Id. at 444. Even stretching the evidence to its logical limit, 
however, the reviewing court may not take a speculative leap to 
bridge a gap between the evidence needed to convict and the evidence 
actually presented at trial. Petree, 659 P.2d at 445. This 
standard restates the due process requirement which prohibits a 
criminal conviction in any case except upon proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime 
with which a defendant is charged. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 
307 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
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In order to survive appellate scrutiny, the jury's verdict 
in this case must be supported by proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
that each element of the crime was proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt, Utah Code Ann. §76-6-302 states the elements of the crime of 
aggravated robbery. For a conviction on this charge the prosecution 
must show that during the course of a robbery a defendant "(a) 
[u]ses a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm, knife or facsimile of 
a knife or a deadly weapon; or (b) [clauses serious bodily injury 
upon another." Section (b) of the statute is not applicable to 
considerations in the case at bar as no such allegations were made. 
The appropriate consideration is only whether a firearm or a 
facsimile of a firearm was used in the course of the robbery. 
As part A of this point states, both witnesses testified 
that they knew the robber was using his hand/finger and not a gun. 
That testimony effectively precludes the element of an actual 
firearm, leaving for discussion only the question of a facsimile of 
a firearm. Part A above also discusses the definition of facsimile 
adopted by this Court, requiring the victims to be misled by the 
facsimile producing in them a belief that the imitation is capable 
of the same consequences as the genuine article. As both witnesses 
recognized this "facsimile" as the hand/finger of the robber, they 
could not have believed that the same consequences could come from 
the hand/finger as from an actual firearm. Accordingly, the 
evidence is lacking that a reasonable person could not have reached 
the verdict in this case beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Support for this position is found in State v. Ulibarri, 
668 P.2d 568 (Utah 1983). In that case an individual entered a 
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store, took beer, and began to leave when questioned by the 
employee. The robber then placed his hand in his pocket and stated, 
"Everything's cool, hold it there or I'll blow you away." In that 
case the defendant was charged and convicted of simple robbery. The 
defendant appealed to reduce the charge to theft, but this Court 
held, in a per curiam opinion, that the factual circumstances 
supported the conviction of robbery. Essentially, the facts of 
Ulibarri are the same as in the case at bar. Fairness and justice 
requires that similarly situated defendants should be treated in 
similar fashion and, therefore, Mr. Bruce should be convicted of 
nothing greater than the similarly situated defendant in Ulibarri. 
The evidence presented by the prosecution in Mr. Bruce's 
case was insufficient to support the guilty verdict on the charge of 
aggravated robbery. The trial court erred originally in even 
submitting the charge of aggravated robbery to the jury. The 
verdict reached by the jury was such that reasonable minds could not 
have reached the verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, 
this Court should exercise its reviewing powers and reverse the 
conviction of Mr. Bruce, impose a verdict on the lesser charge, or 
grant a new trial. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
IN DENYING THE DEFENSE MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
EVIDENCE WHICH WAS OBTAINED FROM AN ILLEGAL 
STOP AND ARREST OF MR. BRUCE 
Prior to trial counsel for the defendant moved to suppress 
evidence obtained from the stop and eventual arrest of Mr. Bruce (R. 
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216-26). Mr. Bruce contends that the trial court committed 
prejudicial error when it denied that motion (R. 227-28). 
The stop and arrest of Mr. Bruce was conducted in violation 
of the guarantees of the United States Constitution and the 
Constitution of the State of Utah. In the case at bar, Police 
Officer Hill based his stop of Mr. Bruce upon all all-channel 
broadcast over his police radio (R. 162). That broadcast instructed 
officers to be on the lookout for an orange Datsun or Volkswagon, 
four door sedan or station wagon, being driven by two black males 
suspected of robbery, both riding in the front seat (R. 162, 172). 
Shortly thereafter Officer Hill spotted an orange vehicle with two 
blacks inside, assumed it to be the suspect vehicle, followed it for 
three blocks, and then stopped it (R. 164-66). 
The error complained of in this case is the lack of a basis 
for the initial broadcast which, in theory, gave Officer Hill the 
probable cause to stop the vehicle and which led to the arrest of 
Mr. Bruce. The law is clear that an arrest is constitutional if it 
is made under the authority of an arrest warrant issued upon a 
showing of probable cause. Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 
480 (1958), as explained in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 112 N.3 
(1964). Absent a warrant, an arrest may still be constitutional if 
made for a felony on probable cause known to the arresting officer. 
United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 414-17 (1976). However, 
whether a warrantless arrest may be constitutional if made for a 
felony on probable cause not known to the arresting officer but 
passed on to him by another source, is less clear. 
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Cases treating this question seem to resolve it as 
contingent upon the particular factual circumstances of the case. 
Annotation, What Constitutes Probable Cause for Arrest—Supreme 
Court Cases, 28 L.Ed.2d 978 (1971). With information from 
confidential informants, for example, their basis of knowledge, 
credibility and reliability remain proper considerations to be 
weighed under a totality of the circumstances standard. Illinois v. 
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 240 (1983). Generally, reasonably trustworthy 
information received from others, when corroborated by the officer's 
personal knowledge, will furnish probable cause for an arrest. 
Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959). 
A case demonstrative of reasonably trustworthy information 
that was received from others and then corroborated by police 
officers is Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970). In Chambers, a 
robbery victim informed police that one of his robbers was wearing a 
green sweater, the other a trench coat. Witnesses in the area heard 
of the robbery and informed police that they had observed a light 
blue compact station wagon circling the block and then later 
speeding from a parking lot near the robbery site. These witnesses 
informed the police that one of the four within the car was wearing 
a green sweater. The police then broadcast the description of the 
car, the green sweater, and the trench coat. Later, other officers 
spotted and stopped a light blue compact station wagon carrying four 
men, one wearing a green sweater. The United States Supreme Court 
held that probable cause existed for the police officers to make the 
stop and arrest. 
The Court's decision was based primarily on the strength of 
the detailed information from the victim and the witnesses which 
together gave the police the probable cause to issue the broadcast. 
On this matter the Court stated, "Having talked to the teen-age 
observers and to the victim Kovachich, the police had ample cause to 
stop a light blue compact station wagon carrying four men and to 
arrest the occupants/ one of whom was wearing a green sweater and 
one of whom had a trench coat with him in the car." 399 U.S. at 
46-47. The police who investigated the crime had enough detailed 
information to establish probable cause and to broadcast that 
information. The officers who made the stop were able to 
corroborate a light blue compact station wagon, four riders, one of 
whom was wearing a green sweater. By corroborating the information 
they too acted with probable cause. 
However, in another police radio bulletin case, Whiteley v. 
Warden of Wyoming State Penetentiary, 401 U.S. 560 (1971), a 
different result was reached. In Whiteley a rural Sheriff prepared 
a complaint which provided a basis for an arrest warrant issued by a 
justice of the peace. The complaint, however, unlike in Chambers, 
was based upon unsupported information from a tip and was totally 
insufficient to support the warrant. The Sheriff nonetheless issued 
a bulletin describing the two suspects and detailing the automobile 
they would likely be driving. The radio broadcast was disseminated 
and police officers in Laramie, on the basis of the broadcast but 
without the warrant, spotted the described vehicle and occupants and 
made the stop and eventual arrest. The Court pointed out that the 
arresting officers were not themselves possessed of any factual data 
- 16 -
corroborating the Sheriff's bulletin that these suspects had 
committed the burglary in question. The defendant argued error for 
lack of probable cause. The State responded that the Laramie 
officers reasonably relied upon the radio bulletin and not the 
Sheriff's bogus complaint. The United States Supreme Court decided 
the matter by stating: 
We do not, of course, question that the Larmie 
police were entitled to act on the strength of 
the radio bulletin. Certainly police officers 
called upon to aid other officers in executing 
arrest warrants are entitled to assume that the 
officers requesting aid offered the magistrate 
the information requisite to support an 
independent judicial assessment of probable 
cause. Where, however, the contrary turns out to 
be true, an otherwise illegal arrest cannot be 
insulated from challenge by the decision of the 
instigating officer to rely on fellow officers to 
make an arrest. 
Whiteley, 401 U.S. at 568 (emphasis added). The United States 
Supreme Court reversed the conviction and ordered excluded all 
evidence gathered by virtue of this illegal arrest. Id. at 569. 
In the case at bar, testimony showed that the robber of the 
Corner Mart left the store on foot, turned the corner and headed 
north (R. 385-86). He was followed at a distance of about 
twenty-five to thirty feet by a witness, Ms. Barton, who testified 
that she observed him cross a street and eventually enter a walkway 
between two apartment buildings (R. 355-56). At that point Ms. 
Barton said she walked through the nearby parking lot. She 
testified that she did not see the robber again (R. 357), but did 
see an orange car—a station wagon—drive away from the apartment 
complex. Her testimony, was explicity clear, however, that she was 
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unable to see how many people were in the car or what the 
occupant(s) looked like (R. 357, 386-87). 
Ms. Barton later testified that she lived in one of the 
apartments of the complex. She testified that she was familiar with 
the automobiles of the other residents, and that the orange car did 
not belong to any of them (R. 424). However, she also admitted that 
a substantial number of businesses were located within a half block 
of the area, and that the street in question is a thoroughfare or 
mainstreet of the area (R. 424-26). 
Ms. Barton then testified that she returned to the store 
and told the police officers, who arrived within minutes, what had 
occurred (R. 360-61). She then stated that "[t]hey talked to us and 
[sic] for a minute, and then there was a dispatch over the radio. 
They had a car stopped that fit the description of the person" (R. 
361). Ms. Barton then accompanied a police officer to where the car 
was stopped and identified the car as the one she had seen leave the 
apartment complex (R. 361-62). Subsequently she identified Mr. 
Bruce as the robber she had followed from the Corner Mart (R. 
363-64). 
The constitutional error reveals itself at this point. 
Inasmuch as the witness could not place the robber in the orange 
automobile, no probable cause existed for the officers at the 
robbery scene to issue a police broadcast which took such liberties 
with the facts. The facts only demonstrated that one robber, a 
Black, headed south into a walkway between the complex. The witness 
saw no one in the orange car; the police broadcast, however, placed 
not one but two black males in the orange car. A magistrate would 
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not have been able to make such a speculative leap from the facts to 
issue a warrant, and police officers in the field who are "engaged 
in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime" are to 
be given even less deference than a neutral magistrate's 
determination of probable cause. See United States v, Watson, 423 
U.S. 411, 423 (1976); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 110-11 (1964); 
and United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 105709 (1965). 
Factually, the case at bar is more similar to Whiteley than 
to Chambers. Chambers can be distinguished inasmuch as the 
witnesses there placed the green sweatered robber in the light blue 
compact station wagon which suspiciously circled the area and then 
sped away from a nearby parking lot at the time of the robbery. The 
green sweatered robber was also identified by the victim, and the 
police officers who made the arrest from the broadcast saw the green 
sweater in the light blue compact station wagon and were able to 
correctly rely on the probable cause which supported the broadcast. 
In this case the situation is more similar to Whiteley 
where officers' reliance on the police broadcast could not withstand 
scrutiny of the probable cause question. Officer Hill, like the 
Laramie officers in Whiteley, was entitled to act on the radio 
bulletin assuming probable cause, but his actions were not supported 
by true probable cause and therefore were illegal and "cannot be 
insulated from challenge by the decision of the investigating 
officer to rely on fellow officers to make an arrest." Whiteley, 
401 U.S. at 568. 
Considerations of public policy demand this result; a 
standard which allows police officers the benefit of the doubt in 
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drawing gaping inferences from inconclusive facts would deteriorate 
the important constitutional preference for warrants as mandated by 
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 
1# §14 of the Constitution of Utah. A decision against Mr. Bruce in 
this case on these facts would encourage police officers to neglect 
the warrant preference, would depreciate the impartial judgments of 
magistrates, and would have a chilling effect on the rights of 
citizens to travel freely without intrusive police investigations 
based on little more than the whim or caprice of the officer on the 
beat. 
As in Whiteley the evidence that was gathered subsequent to 
the illegal arrest should have been excluded from trial as fruits of 
the poisonous tree. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The trial 
court committed error in denying the defendant's motion to exclude 
the evidence, and this Court should reverse the conviction of Mr. 
Bruce and order a new trial. 
Lacking probable cause, a police officer may still stop an 
automobile for investigatory purposes; however, the law requires 
that the police officer must possess an "articulable suspicion" to 
afford him the right to so stop and detain an individual. Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1967). Any stop and detention must be reasonable 
both at inception and in scope. Id. at 19-20. In the case at bar, 
police officer Hill stopped the vehicle in which Mr.Bruce was a 
passenger because he had heard a police radio broadast and believed 
that the car and passengers matched the broadcast. He testified 
that he made the stop because in his mind the passengers were 
"possible armed robbery suspects" (R. 174). He had followed the 
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car for three blocks before pulling it over but was unable to 
articulate any suspicious behavior on the part of the passengers 
other than the non-driver at one point turned his left shoulder and 
looked into or reached into the back seat and then exchanged words 
with the driver (R. 173-74). The car at no time, however, increased 
its speed after that exchange (R. 174), 
Examining the facts against the Terry-stop requirements, 
the initial question is whether the stop was reasonable at its 
inception. The answer is clearly no. As the police broadcast was 
without a factual basis, Police Officer Hill could not claim his 
articulable suspicion from that information. Such a claim should be 
smissed for the same legal reasonings and policy considerations 
gued above. The only additional evidence that police officer Hill 
d to rely upon for his articulable suspicion is that the passenger 
aned over his shoulder and looked into or reached for something in 
the back seat. Such action is hardly tantamount to suspicious 
behavior giving the police officer the right to stop the 
automobile. Therefore, the police officer violated the rights of 
the defendant when he made the stop without the required articulable 
suspicion. Any and all evidence obtained from that point on, 
accordingly, should be excluded from use at trial. Mapp v. Ohio, 
367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
As the reasonableness at inception requirement was not met 
on these facts, discussion of the reasonableness of the scope of the 
detention need not be presented. The police radio broadcast was 
totally without a basis in fact; everything that evolved from that 
point forward was tainted. If, however, Officer Hill had been able 
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to articulate an independent suspicion to pull over and investigate, 
the new suspicion may have rehabilitated the ill-founded broadcast. 
Officer Hill was unable to articulate such a suspicion, and as such, 
the resulting evidence that was uncovered by the illegal stop should 
have been excluded by the trial court. Failure to do so prejudiced 
the defendant. Mr. Bruce's conviction should now be overturned and 
a new trial ordered in which the tainted evidence could not be used. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING APPELLANT'S 
PRE-TRIAL MOTION TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF HIS 
PRIOR CONVICTIONS 
Prior to trial, counsel for Mr. Bruce moved the trial court 
for an order to prevent the State from impeaching the credibility of 
Mr. Bruce with evidence of his prior convictions. Mr. Bruce's prior 
record included a 1980 conviction for retail theft, a second degree 
felony; a 1979 conviction for attempted burglary, a Class A 
misdemeanor; and a 1984 conviction for retail theft, a Class A 
misdemeanor (R. 230-32). The trial court denied the motion (R. 
290-91). Mr. Bruce now contends that the denial of the motion to 
exclude evidence of prior convictions constituted reversible error 
by the trial court because the prior convictions did not involve 
dishonesty or false statement as required by Rule 609 (a)(2). 
The State, during the pre-trial discussion of the motion, 
openly indicated a desire to use the prior convictions to impeach 
the credibility of Mr. Bruce at trial (R. 286). Aware of the 
State's intent an.d in spite of the trial court's denial of the 
motion, Mr. Bruce still decided to testify at trial so that his 
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story might be heard. Therefore, in an effort to reduce the 
negative impact of the prior convictions on the jury, and also 
because of the State's expressed intent to use the prior convictions 
to impeach credibility, counsel for Mr. Bruce took the strategic 
position of introducing the prior convictions during the Defendant's 
direct testimony (R. 513). This strategy was employed by counsel so 
that the shock value of prior criminal conduct could be minimized 
and so that the Defendant would not be seen to be hiding something 
which would be uncovered during cross-examination.1 
The trial court relied on a Utah case, State v. Cintron, 
680 P.2d 33 (Utah 1984), to deny the motion to exclude prior 
convictions (R. 290-91). This reliance, however, was misplaced; 
1
 Mr. Bruce acknowledges case precedent which implies a waiver of 
the claim of error in denying the motion to not allow impeachment by 
prior convictions if the prior conviction is brought out on direct 
as opposed to cross examination. However, Mr. Bruce contends that 
such cases are pre-Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38 (1984), cases, 
and because Luce now requires that a defendant must take the stand 
in his own behalf to preserve a claim, those prior cases which imply 
a waiver should be strongly resisted. 
Policy considerations and fundamental fairness demand that if the 
defendant must take the stand to preserve a claim for appeal, 
counsel may employ a strategy to bring out the prior convictions on 
direct examination. To do otherwise would grant unwarranted 
advantage to the State. The jury would doubtfully understand the 
legal technicality forbidding the defendant from being completely 
truthful and honest with the jury about prior convictions; and when 
such information was "uncovered" by the State on cross examination, 
the jury would subconsciously, if not consciously, discount the 
credibility of the defendant. The jury would infer from the 
defendant's conduct an intent on his part to hide or hope to hide 
the information of prior convictions. 
This Court should therefore not foreclose Mr. Bruce's appeal on 
this issue based on antiquated legal reasoning which contradicts the 
defendant's desire to testify and deliver the "whole" truth to the 
jury who will determine his guilt or innocence. 
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Cintron was decided under the old rule, Rule 21, which was in effect 
prior to the adoption of the federal rules, which governed the trial 
of this case. As will be discussed below, the adoption of the 
federal rules indicated a "fresh start" for the evidence law of 
Utah. The new rules were to be guided with an eye to federal case 
law for interpretation, and the new rules would supplant all 
inconsistent rules and statutes. State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 
1334 n.40 (Utah 1986) (stating that to the extent that previous 
opinions are inconsistent with Rule 609, they are overruled). 
Cintron was a per curiam opinion wherein the Court briefly 
concluded that theft impliedly is admissible for impeachment 
purposes as it involves dishonesty. That position, however, is 
unsupported and remains inconsistent with federal cases as will be 
demonstrated below. As Cintron is inconsistent with the purposes of 
the federal rules as well as case precedents, that decision should 
be overruled and play no role in defining the new rule. 
Rule 609 of the Utah Rules of Evidence2 governs the 
question of impeachment of the defendant as a witness by evidence of 
prior convicionts. (See Addendum B). On April 13, 1983, this Court 
adopted new evidence rules substantially patterned after the Federal 
Rules of Evidence. These rules became effective in Utah on 
September 1, 1983. The rule in question in this case, Rule 609(a) 
was adopted verbatim from the federal rules. Speaking to that 
matter, the Committee which promulgated the rules stated, "The 
1
 The record incorrectly refers to this rule as 409. Rule 409 
relates to the payment of medical and similar expenses and has no 
relevance in this discussion. See Addendum B for Rule 609. 
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1983 Utah Rules of Evidence . . . supplant the 1971 Rules and all 
other inconsistent statutes or rules. "^  The Committee also added, 
"These rules therefore supply a fresh starting place for the law of 
evidence. . ." State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1333 (Utah 1986). 
Specific to the case at hand is Rule 609(a)(2), which 
concerns impeachment by conviction for offenses involving dishonesty 
or false statement. During the pre-trial discussion of the motion 
on this issue, counsel for Mr. Bruce stated that the question the 
Court had to reach was whether any of the prior convictions were 
automatically admissible in that they involved dishonesty or false 
statement (R. 231-32). The prosecutor agreed with that 
characterization of the issue (R. 232), and then later stated: 
[A]ll we would claim for the prior conviction is 
the section 2 involving dishonesty and false 
statement, regardless of the punishment. We are 
not claiming under section one. We are not 
claiming this is more probative than prejudicial. 
. . . So, we are not going to argue that. The 
only issue the State sees is whether these prior 
convictions are convictions that involve 
dishonesty or false statement (R. 237). 
While the parties agreed that the issue involved an (a)(2) question, 
the rule is rather new and this Court has not yet addressed what 
crimes qualify as crimes of dishonesty or false statement under 
(a)(2). However, as the Utah rule is a verbatim replica of the 
federal rule, ample federal case law exists to act as a guide. 
Furthermore, the preliminary note to the new Utah Rules of Evidence 
states, "Since the advisory committee generally sought to achieve 
3
 See footnote 6 and accompanying text of Boyce, Utah Rules of 
Evidence 1983, 85 Utah L. Rev. 64. 
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uniformity between Utah's rules and the federal rules, this Court 
looks to the interpretations of the federal rules by the federal 
courts to aid in interpreting the Utah rules." State v. Banner, 717 
P.2d 1325, 1333-34 (Utah 1986). 
The federal courts are not in complete agreement on what 
constitutes "dishonesty or false statement,"4 but the better 
reasoned cases strongly indicate that the retail theft and attempted 
burglary convictions of Mr. Bruce should not have been admissible at 
trial. In United States v. Smith, 551 P.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1976), 
which this Court cited in its recent 609(a)(1) State v. Banner 
decision, the circuit court discussed in detail the legislative 
history of Rule 609(a) pointing out the heated debate which spawned 
the formulation of the rule. That court quoted the Conference 
Committee Report which stated: 
By the phrase "dishonesty and false statement" 
the Conference means crimes such as perjury or 
subornation of perjury, false statement, criminal 
fraud, embezzlement, or false pretense, or any 
other offense in the nature of crimen falsi, the 
commission of which involves some element of 
deceit, untruthfulness, or falsification bearing 
on the accused's propensity to testify truthfully. 
Smith, 551 F.2d at 362, (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1597, 93d 
Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. 
News, pp. 7098, 7103). Footnote 26 of the Smith opinion discussed 
in detail the history of crimen falsi concluding that crimes of the 
type that Mr. Bruce previously had been convicted of committing 
would not qualify under the crimen falsi designation. Id. at 362-63. 
4
 See generally, Annot. Rule 609(a)(2): Convictions Admissible; 
Crimes Involving Dishonesty, 39 ALR Fed. 596 §15. 
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Another opinion from the same circuit gave further light on 
what Congress' intent was with regards to Rule 609 (a)(2). In a 
statement from the court in United States v. Millingsf 535 F.2d 121 
(D.C. Cir. 1976), which is also applicable to the prior convictions 
of Mr. Bruce, the court reasoned: 
An intent to deceive or defraud is not an element 
of either offense. . . . Certainly we cannot say 
that either offense, in the language of the 
Conference Committee, is "peculiarly probative of 
credibility." Although it may be argued that any 
wilful violation of law. . . evinces a lack of 
character and a disregard for all legal duties, 
including the obligations of an oath, Congress 
has not accepted that expansive theory. 
535 F.2d at 123. The clear intent of Congress was to limit the 
introduction of prior convictions for impeachment purposes only to 
those crimes which bear directly on a witness1 propensity to not 
tell the truth. Otherwise, one could argue, as discounted in 
Millings, that any crime could be introduced to impeach. As the 
Millings court unequivocally stated, Congress simply did not intend 
to adopt as expanded a position as that would be. The prior 
convictions of Mr. Bruce, retail theft and attempted burglary, do 
not bear on his propensity to tell or not tell the truth; they show 
no deceit or dishonesty as meant by Congress. Accordingly, it was 
error for the trial court to deny Mr. Bruce's motion to suppress 
that information. 
In United States v. Glenn, 667 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1982), 
the court held that the crimes of burglary and grand theft were not 
admissible under Rule 609 (a)(2) without a showing of accompanying 
fraudulent or deceitful conduct. The burden rests with the State to 
make such a showing. Generally, the court observed that crimes of 
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violence, theft crimes (as in the case at bar), and crimes of 
stealth do not involve "dishonesty or false statement" within the 
proper meaning of Rule 609 (a)(2). United States v. Seamster, 568 
F.2d 188 (10th Cir. 1978), held similarly. The court stated that 
"dishonesty and false statement" does not include convictions for 
burglary (a prior conviction of attempted burglary in the case at 
bar) or robbery since the terms are used in a restrictive manner and 
are limited to those prior convictions which manifest deceit, 
untruthfulness, or falsification which would demonstrate that the 
accused would be likely to testify untruthfully. 
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit held that a prior conviction 
for felony theft could not be used for impeachment purposes under 
Rule 609(a)(2) because a prior theft does not bear upon a witness's 
propensity to testify truthfully. The court stated that felony 
theft (a prior conviction in the case at bar) does not involve 
"dishonesty or false statement" of the credibility-deteriorating 
quality contemplated by Rule 609(a)(2). Howard v. Gonzales, 658 
F.2d 352 (5th Cir. 1981). 
Mr* Bruce's prior convictions are not demonstrable of a 
propensity to lie under oath. The State made no such showing; 
accordingly, the trial court committed reversible error in denying 
the motion to prevent the evidence from being entered for 
impeachment purposes. The conviction of Mr. Bruce should be 
reversed and the case remanded back to the trial court for a new 
trial without the admission of Mr. Bruce's prior convictions. 
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POINT IV, 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SUPPRESS OFFICER 
MERRICK'S IN COURT IDENTIFICATION OF THE DEFENDANT 
Prior to trial/ counsel for the defendant filed a Motion in 
Limine to suppress Officer John Merrick's identification of Henry 
Bruce (R. 157). The motion was based on a suggestive out-of-court/ 
one photo show-up conducted by Mr. Merrick (R. 272-74). The trial 
court denied the motion and allowed Officer Merrick to testify (R. 
482-83). Defense counsel properly preserved the issue for appeal by 
objecting at trial (R. 488). The Appellant now asserts the trial 
court committed prejudicial error by permitting that testimony and 
identification by Officer Merrick. 
Officer John Merrick, is employed by the Salt Lake County 
Sheriff's Office at the County Jail. Officer Merrick offered 
testimony that while off duty and on his way goose hunting on the 
day of the robbery, he observed two black males standing near a 
phone booth one half block east of the Corner Mart. He testified 
that he recognized both individuals, recalling the name of one but 
not the other. He testified at trial that the other individual at 
the phone booth whom he recognized but whose name he did not know 
was Mr. Bruce (R. 484-89). This identification, however, was the 
product of a suggestive show-up and should have been suppressed. 
In Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968) the United 
States Supreme Court, addressing the issue of suggestive show-ups, 
stated: 
This danger [that the witness may make an 
incorrect identification] will be increased if 
the police display to the witness only the 
picture of a single individual who generally 
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resembles the person he saw, or if they show him 
the pictures of several persons among which the 
photograph of a single such individual recurs or 
is in some way emphasized. The chance of 
misidentification is also heightened if the 
police indicate to the witness that they have 
other evidence that one of the persons pictured 
committed the crime. Regardless of how the 
initial misidentification comes about/ the 
witness thereafter is apt to retain in his memory 
the image of the photograph rather than of the 
person actually seen, reducing the 
trustworthiness of subsequent lineup or courtroom 
identification. 
390 U.S. at 383-84 (footnotes omitted). The Court, however, then 
stated that despite the hazards involved it would be unwilling to 
prohibit such photographic show-ups as a per se rule but would 
prefer that each be considered on its own facts. The Court held 
that "convictions based on eyewitness identification at trial 
following a pretrial identification by photograph will be set aside 
on that ground only if the photographic identification procedure was 
so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial 
likelihood of irreparable misidentification." Id. at 384. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has adopted the position taken in 
Simmons adding: 
[T]he circumstances of the individual case should 
be scrutinized carefully by the trial court to 
see whether in the identification procedures 
there was anything done which should be regarded 
as so suggestive or persuasive that there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the identification was 
not a genuine product of the knowledge and 
recollection of the witness, but was something so 
distorted or tainted that in fairness and 
justness the guilt or innocence of an accused 
should not be allowed to be tested thereby. 
State v. Perry, 492 P.2d 1349, 1352 (Utah 1972). In this case the 
trial court was clearly in error when it allowed Officer Merrick to 
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testify. Merrick had no prior face to face conversations or 
confrontations with Mr. Bruce. He testified outside the presence of 
the jury during the pre-trial motion to exclude his testimony that 
he had only seen Mr. Bruce once or twice before in the halls of the 
County Jail (R. 272, 493). Allowing Merrick's testimony with 
certain limitations had the effect of limiting defense counsel in 
her latitude on cross examination. For example, she was unable to 
pursue where, for how long, and under what circumstances Merrick had 
previously observed Mr. Bruce without severely prejudicing her own 
client (R. 481-83). 
Officer Merrick was on his way to a Seven-Eleven prior to 
going goose hunting. He saw two individuals near a phone booth 
while he was stopped at a red light for about one minute (R. 
484-85). He saw them again on his way back from the Seven-Eleven, 
again waiting for about thirty seconds to one minute (R. 492). He 
was one hundred yards away—across the width of the street and 
across a parking lot (R. 488-90). He could see a frontal view of 
the individuals only part of the time as they were moving around and 
then the person he did not recognize by name walked away from him 
(R. 262-65, 490-92). 
Officer Merrick then went goose hunting. The following day 
Merrick went to work and looked at the docket sheets (R. 266). He 
saw that the person he recognized by name, Otis Latham, had been 
arrested. He found that the person arrested with Latham was named 
Henry Bruce (R. 266). Officer Merrick then pulled Mr. Bruce's 
arrest file, looked at the photograph and concluded that Mr. Bruce 
was the man he had seen with Latham (R. 266-67). Officer Merrick 
did not participate in the line-up (R. 494). 
The United States Supreme Court has commented on an 
identification procedure similar to the one used by Officer Merrick 
in this case admonishing that "[t]he practice of showing suspects 
singly to persons for the purpose of identification, and not part of 
a lineup, has been widely condemned." Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 
293, 303 (1967). The actions taken by Officer Merrick were 
extremely suggestive. He confirmed a very short and distant 
observation of someone he had recognized from only one or two prior 
occasions by going to an arrest file and examining the lone 
photograph therein. The subsequent identification—as stated in 
Simmons—is suspect as it is difficult to know whether the 
identification is a product of the photograph rather than Merrick's 
own recollection. Furthermore, the Court in Simmons explained that 
the identification is further tainted inasmuch as the photograph was 
found in conjunction with an arrest, heightening the chance for 
misidentification. The trustworthiness of the in-court 
identification was thereby nullified and the trial court erred in 
not suppressing the testimony of Officer Merrick. 
By allowing Officer Merrick to identify Mr. Bruce at trial, 
Mr. Bruce's due process rights were violated. His position was 
prejudiced, and accordingly, the conviction should be reversed and 
the case remanded for a new trial without the tainted identification. 
In Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972), the United 
States Supreme Court catagorized the central question of suggestive 
identification cases as "whether under the 'totality of the 
circumstances' the identification was reliable even though the 
confrontation was suggestive." To analyze this question the Court 
- 32 -
indicated appropriate factors for consideration to be (1) the 
opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the 
crime, (2) the witness' degree of attention, (3) the accuracy of the 
witness1 prior description of the criminal, (4) the level of 
certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and (5) 
the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. Id. 
Applying these factors to the facts in this case, the 
totality of the circumstances weigh heavily that Officer Merrick 
should not have been allowed to testify. As noted above, Officer 
Merrick's opportunity to view the men at the phone booth was 
limited, at best. He saw them for less than two minutes total and 
from a distance of over 100 yards away. He did not even have a view 
of the full face of the man he recognized for all the time as the 
men were moving around. In the short amount of time available for 
Merrick to view the two men, it is doubtful that his degree of 
attention was anywhere near sufficient to rely upon; he was waiting 
at stop lights. Officer Merrick had other cars in front of him and 
must have repeatedly glanced to see if the light had changed. A 
view of two men for less than two minutes total, from 100 yards 
away, while repeatedly glancing at the stop light is suspect in and 
of itself, let alone reliable for eyewitness testimony. 
Yet, Officer Merrick was allowed to testify. He had given 
no prior description to rely upon other than he recognized though 
did not know the name of the man. His level of certainty that Mr. 
Bruce was the man he had seen seems adequate at first blush; but 
when contrasted with the fact that he had never before talked with 
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Mr. Bruce or stood face to face with him in either of the one or two 
prior sightings, the subsequent identification becomes totally 
suspect and untrustworthy. The only factor which even facially 
appears reliable is the length of time between Officer Merrick's 
first look at the men and his identification by the lone photograph 
the following day. But, as the other four factors indicate, under 
the totality of the circumstances the method of identification the 
following day becomes even more suspect. By going to an arrest file 
to support the identification of the unnamed man, Officer Merrick 
completely destroyed what little bit of neutral observation he could 
have given. The arrest file photograph was simply too suggestive 
for anyone now to know whether the later in-court identification was 
the product of memory from the initial viewing or from the 
photograph. Analyzing this query under the less than adequate 
initial viewing of the men by Officer Merrick, the arrest file one 
photo show-up greatly increased the chance of misidentification and, 
therefore, the in-court identification was much too suggestive for 
the trial court to have allowed the officer to testify. 
By allowing Merrick to testify, Mr. Bruce's due process 
rights were violated and he suffered prejudice. The conviction 
should accordingly be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial 
without the tainted identification. 
POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITED PREJUCIAL ERROR 
BY REFUSING TO GIVE THE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION ON IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY, 
At trial defense counsel requested that a cautionary 
instruction regarding eyewitness identification be given to the 
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jury. (See Addendum C.) The trial court refused to give the 
instruction and defense counsel took exception (R. 578-79). 
The issue of lack of reliability of eye witness 
identification has been well documented in legal literature.5 
Justice Brennan expressed the concern of many commentators when he 
wrote, "The vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known; 
the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken 
identification." United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967). 
Echoing this concern, the late Justice Felix Frankfurter observed: 
What is the worth of identification testimony even when 
uncontradicted? The identification of strangers is 
proverbially untrustworthy. The hazards of such testimony 
are established by a formidable number of instances in the 
records of English and American trials. . . . 
Evidence as to identity based on personal impressions, 
however bonafide, is perhaps of all classes of evidence the 
least to be relied upon, and therefore, unless supported by 
other facts, an unsafe basis for the verdict of a jury. 
The Case of Sacco and Vanzetti, 30 (1927). 
5
 Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological Testimony on the 
Unrealiability of Eyewitness Identification, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 969 
(1977); Due Process Standards for the Admissibility of Eyewitness 
Identification Evidence, 26 Kan. L. Rev. 461 (1978); Eyewitness 
Identification Evidence: Flaws and Defenses, 7 No. Ky. L. Rev. 407 
(1980); Ellis, Davies, Shepherd, Experimental Studies of Face 
Identification, 3 Nat. J. Crim. Def. 219 (1977); Use of Eyewitness 
Identification Evidence in Criminal Trials, 21 Crim. L.Q. 361 
(1979); Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony (1979); Public Defender 
Sourcebook, pp. 251-57 (S. Singer, ed. 1976); Yarmey, The Psychology 
of Eyewitness Testimony (1979); Buckout, Determinants of Eyewitness 
Performance on a Lineup, 1974 Bull. Psychonomic Soc'y. 191; 
Buckout, Eyewitness Identification and Psychology in the Courtroom, 
Crim. Def., Sept. Oct. 1977, at 5-9; Buckout, Eyewitness Testimony, 
Scientific Am., Dec. 1974, at 23; Levine & Tapp, The Psychology of 
Criminal Identification; The Gap from Wade to Kirby, 121 U. Pa. 
L.Rev. 1079 (1973); Luce, The Neglected Dimension in Eyewitness 
Identification, Crim. Def., May-June 1977 at 5-8; Tyrell & 
Cunningham, Eyewitness Credibility: Adjusting the Sights of the 
Judiciary, 37 Ala. Law. 563, 575-85 (1976). 
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The unreliability of eyewitness identification also has 
been much discussed by this Court, of late, recognizing the 
complexities involved and mandating a required instruction when 
identification is at issue. See State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 492 
(Utah 1986). The holding of State v. Long, however, was expressly 
limited in its application to those cases tried after its date of 
decision. Id. Appellant Henry Brucefs trial preceded the Long 
decision, and accordingly must be evaluated under the pre-Long 
standard which required an examination of whether the trial court 
abused its discretion in refusing to give the requested cautionary 
instruction concerning eyewitness identification. 
The pre-Long cases were treated fully in Long and State v. 
Jonas, 725 P.2d 1378 (Utah 1986). Prior to Long, the giving of a 
cautionary instruction regarding eyewitness identification was a 
matter left to the discretion of the trial court after consideration 
of circumstances surrounding the identification. State v. Tucker, 
706 P.2d 313, 316 (Utah 1985). In State v. Schaffer, 638 P.2d 1185 
(Utah 1981), for example, one witness had substantial opportunity to 
observe the defendant while the defendant ordered pizza and waited 
for the other customers to leave the restaurant. Additionally, the 
witness also observed the defendant while he robbed two cash 
registers and then forced her into a refrigerator. This Court held 
that the trial judge had not abused its discretion in refusing to 
give the requested cautionary instruction because of the witness1 
abundant opportunity to view the defendant and also general 
instructions regarding witness reliability and burden of proof had 
been given. 
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In State v, Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56 (Utah 1982), the crime 
occurred over a seven to eight minute span of time in broad 
daylight. The trial court had not given a requested cautionary 
instruction, and no abuse of the trial court's discretion was found 
on appeal. Similarly, no cautionary instructions were given in 
State v. Newton, 681 P.2d 833 (Utah 1984); State v. Reedy, 681 P.2d 
1251 (Utah 1984); nor State v. Watson, 684 P.2d 39 (Utah 1976). In 
each of these cases the defendants were viewed by the respective 
witnesses in daylight's sun for extended periods of time before and 
during robberies. This Court found the witnesses' certainty 
regarding the identifications significant and held that no abuse of 
discretion occurred in refusing to give the requested instruction. 
Despite the fact that this Court had always found in favor 
of the trial court's use of its restraint in giving the instruction, 
the cases left open the possibility that an abuse of discretion 
could occur. In State v. Tucker, 709 P.2d 313 (Utah 1985), this 
Court stated that "under suitable circumstances a cautionary 
instruction of the type requested would be required." Id. at 316. 
State v. Reedy, 681 P.2d 1251, contained language which indicated 
that a failure to give a requested instruction may amount to an 
abuse of the trial court's discretion if the circumstances 
surrounding the eyewitness identification raise serious questions of 
reliability. Id. at 1253-54. The decision in Reedy also indicated 
that the standard of review requires an examination of the "totality 
of the circumstances." Id. at 1254. 
In reviewing the totality of the circumstances in State v. 
Jonas, 725 P.2d 1378 (Utah 1986), this Court did find that a trial 
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court abused its discretion in failing to give a cautionary 
instruction. The sole witness in Jonas had a very short look at the 
defendant in very poor lighting. The witness identified the 
defendant from a photograph which varied somewhat from the 
description he had earlier given the police. This Court also 
indicated that "[t]he victim's trial testimony demonstrated that 
there was a great deal of uncertainty and hesitancy in the manner in 
which he arrived at his identification of defendant during the photo 
array." Id. at 1381. This Court held that "the trial court abused 
its discretion in not giving a cautionary instruction about the 
weaknesses inherent in eyewitness identification." Id. As such, 
the conviction was reversed and the case remanded for new trial. 
Admittedly, Jonas is the only pre-Long case, to this date, 
wherein this Court found that the trial court abused its discretion 
in not giving the requested cautionary instruction. Noteworthy, 
however, is that in all other pre-Long cases the witness or 
witnesses were all consistent in the identifications of their 
respective defendants.6 Jonas was the first case in which even a 
hint of uncertainty in identification presented itself. This case 
is more like Jonas than the other pre-Long cases. In the case at 
bar the witnesses displayed much more than a hint of uncertainty and 
6
 In Reedy, twelve days after the robbery the victim picked the 
defendant's picture from a group of six photographs stating that he 
was "one hundred percent sure" about the identification. More than 
a year later, however, the victim was unable to make a positive 
in-court identification of the defendant. The victim's difficulty 
with identifying the defendant at trial was because over that period 
of time the defendant had lost considerable weight, grew his hair 
longer, and curled his hair. 681 P.2d at 1252. 
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inconsistency in their ability to identify the defendant; indeed, 
this case is replete with misidentifications, a non-identification, 
and an identification tainted by a suggestive one photo show-up. 
Therefore, given the inherent weaknesses in eyewitness 
identification, the trial court should have granted the requested 
cautionary instruction which spoke to the particular difficulties in 
this factual situation. Failure to do so was an abuse of the trial 
court's discretion. 
The factual peculiarities in Mr. Bruce's case will show 
that the totality of the circumstances clearly dicated that the 
requested cautionary instruction on eyewitness identification be 
given. Four witnesses offered testimony at trial—eyewitness 
identifications—that either placed appellant Bruce in the area at 
the time of the crime or identified him as a participant in the 
crime. However, none of the four witnesses were able to pick Mr. 
Bruce from a police line-up: two of the witnesses picked the same 
other individual, the third picked no one at all, and the fourth did 
not even participate. In fact, the only time the witnesses could 
pick the defendant was when he was by himself at counsel table—a 
time when he was the only young Black in the room. 
Specifically, the first witness to testify at trial was Sue 
Ann Candelaria, the employee of the robbed Corner Mart. She failed 
to identify Mr. Bruce at the line-up on January 14, 1986, as the 
individual who had robbed the store. She actually identified 
someone else as the robber (R. 316). Later that same day at the 
preliminary hearing she did identify Mr. Bruce as the robber. 
However, when asked by defense counsel as to why she failed to pick 
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Mr, Bruce at the line-up but could identify him at the preliminary 
hearing she stated, "You know what you are suppose to do. It has 
been two months. I don't know what he looks like. He did it, so 
what is the big deal?" (R. 338-39). Furthermore, she acknowledged 
having seen Mr. Bruce at the line-up earlier that day and that she 
did not pick him as the robber (R. 337). She also testified that 
she became aware prior to the preliminary hearing that she failed to 
pick the "right" person from the line-up (R. 346). These facts 
clearly indicate that the reliability of the witness' identification 
of Mr. Bruce was at issue. The requested cautionary instruction 
should have been given to alert the jury to the potential for error. 
This witness additionally testified that she had been only 
an arm's length away from the robber of the Corner Mart (R. 329), 
that he spoke to her and she saw his teeth (R. 343). Her 
reliability as an eyewitness, however, became even further suspect 
because she did not include in her description to the police that 
the robber had a small tattoo on his forehead and a gold-capped 
front tooth (R. 331). Mr. Henry Bruce has both a small tattoo on 
his forehead and a visible gold-capped front tooth; he has had them 
from 1969 and 1972, respectively (R. 513). 
In short, Ms. Candelaria was an arm's length from the 
robber but could not recall physical oddities of the robber. She 
later did not pick Mr. Bruce as the robber—who had allegedly been 
so close to her—from a line-up. She actually identified someone 
else as the robber. In fact, Ms. Candelaria could only identify 
Mr. Bruce as the one who had robbed the Corner Mart when he was the 
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only Black or one of only two Blacks in the room, the other being 
taller, much older and with grey hair (R. 336). 
The totality of this witness1 testimony brings to question 
whether the testimony she offered was from her own recollection. 
The possibility that the testimony was not based on her own 
recollection is best viewed through her remark at the preliminary 
hearing when she stated, "You know what you are suppose to do. It 
has been two months. I don't know what he looks like. He did it so 
what is the big deal?" (R. 338-39). The "big deal," of course, is 
that well phrased admonition from In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (as quoted in State v. Long, 721 
P.2d at 491), warning that "it is far worse to convict an innocent 
man than to let a guilty man go free." 
The reliability of the identification of Mr. Bruce by this 
witness was clearly at issue. The inconsistencies in this witness1 
testimony clearly mandated the giving of the requested instruction. 
The requested instruction addressed a number of concerns which were 
important for the jury's consideration. Of specific importance with 
regards to this witness were points (2) and (3) of the requested 
instruction. They read: 
(2) Are you satisifed that the identification 
made by the witness subsequent to the offense was 
the product of his own recollection? You may 
take into account both the strength of the 
identification and the circumstances under which 
the identification was made. 
If the identification by the witness may 
have been influenced by the circumstances under 
which the defendant was presented to him for 
identification, you should scrutinize the 
identification with great care. . . . 
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(3) You may take into account any occasion in 
which the witness failed to make an 
identification of the defendant, or made an 
identification that was inconsistent with his 
identification at trial. 
The circumstances of this witness1 testimony dictated that this 
instruction be given. It was an abuse of the trial court's 
discretion not to do so. 
The second witness, Ruthie K. Barton, is the sister of Sue 
Ann Candelaria. She was also present at the Corner Mart when the 
robbery occurred. She testified as being three to five feet from 
the robber with a profile perspective lasting a few minutes (R. 247, 
353). The robber faced and spoke to her at one point, but she—like 
her sister—did not include in her description to police nor testify 
to having seen a tattoo or a gold-capped tooth (R. 256, 353-54). In 
addition to the in-store observation of the robber, she followed him 
from a distance of twenty-five to thirty feet across a street. She 
saw him enter a sidewalk area between apartments in an apartment 
complex (R. 354-57). 
About ten or fifteen minutes later Ms. Barton overheard a 
police dispatch that "a car [had been] stopped that fit the 
description of the person" (R. 361). She then accompanied a police 
officer to where the car had been stopped and upon arrival 
identified "the guy that had been in the store first and then the 
other one" (R. 364). The identification of Mr. Bruce as the robber 
was based solely on the clothing he was wearing (R. 254). That 
clothing was described by the witness as dark corduroys and "a sweat 
jacket with white and another color. It was a dark color." She 
also indicated that the robber was wearing a ski cap (R. 255). When 
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stopped by police, Mr. Bruce was not wearing a ski cap and one was 
never found by police, either in the car or the immediate area. 
Mr. Bruce was, however, wearing corduroys and a two-colored sweat 
jacket—both common articles of clothing. 
At the line-up Ms. Barton did not select Mr. Bruce as the 
robber of the Corner Mart. She, in fact, chose as the robber the 
same other individual that her sister chose; and like her sister, 
she too had observed that Mr. Bruce was in the line-up (R. 405-07). 
Subsequently, at the preliminary hearing, she identified Mr. Bruce 
as the robber. Again, however, Mr. Bruce was but one of two black 
men in the room, the other being taller, older, and grey haired. 
Despite the fact that she again pointed at Mr. Bruce at the trial 
when asked if the robber was in the courtroom, the requested 
cautionary instruction should have been given based on the relevant 
facts of this witness1 testimony. Ms. Barton's important eye 
witness testimony, like her sister's before her, was suspect because 
she chose someone other than Mr. Bruce from the line-up and also 
because it is questionable that the in-court identifications were 
the product of her own recollection. Furthermore, the cautionary 
instruction should have been given to the jury to alert them that an 
"identification made by picking the defendant out of a group of 
similar individuals is generally more reliable than one which 
results from the presentation of the defendant alone to the witness" 
(See requested instruction point (2), Addendum C). 
The third person providing eye witness testimony regarding 
Mr. Brucefs presence in the area near the time of the crime was 
Janine Dempsey, an employee of the neighboring Self's Food Town. 
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She testified that two men were in her store ten minutes before the 
robbery. She stated that they were in the store "ten seconds at the 
most" (R. 465). Her testimony was that she was bending down putting 
up a display when they entered. The shorter man spoke to her, but 
she did not notice a gold-capped tooth nor a tattoo. Ms. Dempsey 
did, however, notice Mr. Bruce in the police line-up, but she did 
not pick anyone from that line up. She stated, "I wasn't absolutely 
sure. Therefore, I didnft mark anything down." (R. 469-73). She 
also testified that while in the store she had noticed the taller, 
older man more than the shorter man (R. 466), therefore her 
observation of the man she subsequently identified as Mr. Bruce was 
extremely limited at best. 
Ms. Dempsey identified Mr. Bruce at trial as the shorter 
man in her store ten minutes prior to the robbery. Nonetheless, she 
was unable to identify him from the group at the line-up; and 
inasmuch as she had a very limited amount of time to observe that 
shorter individual, her eye witness testimony was also suspect and 
at issue. Accordingly, the requested cautionary identification 
instruction should have been given. Failure to give that 
instruction was an abuse of the trial court's discretion. 
The fourth and final eye witness, John Merrick, is employed 
by the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office at the County Jail. While 
off duty and on his way goose hunting, he observed two black males 
standing near a phone booth one half block east of the Corner Mart. 
He testified that he recognized both individuals, recalling the name 
of one but not the other. He testified at trial that the other 
individual at the phone booth whom he recongized but whose name he 
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did not know was Mr. Bruce (R. 484-89). This identification, 
however, was the product of a suggestive one photo show-up. 
Merrick had no prior face to face conversations or 
confrontations with Mr. Bruce. He had only seen Mr. Bruce once or 
twice before in the halls of the County Jail (R. 272, 493). Officer 
Merrick was on his way to a Seven-Eleven prior to going goose 
hunting. He saw two individuals near a phone booth while he was 
stopped at a red light for about one minute. He saw them again on 
his way back from the Seven-Eleven, again waiting for about thirty 
seconds to one minute. He was one hundred yards away—across the 
width of the street and across a parking lot (R. 490-92). He could 
see a frontal view of the individuals only part of the time as they 
were moving around and then the person he did not recongize by name 
walked in a direction away from Officer Merrick (R. 262-65, 492-94). 
Officer Merrick then went goose hunting. The following day 
Merrick went to work and looked at the docket sheets. He saw that 
the person he recognized by name, Otis Latham, had been arrested. 
He found that the person arrested with Latham was named Henry 
Bruce. Officer Merrick then pulled Mr. Bruce's arrest file, looked 
at the photograph and concluded that Mr. Bruce was the man he had 
seen with Latham. Officer Merrick did not participate in the 
line-up (R. 266-67, 494). 
The actions taken by Officer Merrick were extremely 
suggestive. He confirmed a very short observance of someone he had 
recognized from only one or two prior occasions by going to an 
arrest file and examining the lone photograph therein. His 
subsequent in-court identification is tained and suspect as it is 
- 4R -
difficult to know whether the identification is a product of the 
photograph rather than his own recollection. See State v. Perry/ 
492 P.2d 1349/ 1352 (Utah 1972). (See alsof Point IV of this 
appeal.) The identification is further tainted because the 
photograph was found in conjunction with an arrest and therefore/ 
under highly suggestive circumstances. Id. The trustworthiness of 
the in-court identification is thereby nullified and the trial court 
erred in not giving the requested cautionary eyewitness 
identification instruction to the jury. 
This case is critically distinct from any prior case 
involving the trial court's denial of a cautionary eyewitness 
identification instruction. In this case the state presented four 
eyewitnesses; mere number, however, should not add credence to the 
state's case. Each witness' testimony was dubious under the 
particular circumstances. Unlike any prior case where the requested 
instruction was refused and later upheld as an appropriate use of 
discretion/ here the witnesses made misidentifications or failed to 
make an identification from a group# or tainted the identification 
by viewing a lone photograph of the accused. Identification was, 
therefore, unquestionably at issue. The requested cautionary 
instruction was designed to alert the jury to the difficulties 
inherent in eyewitness testimony. The totality of the circumstances 
in this case demanded that the instruction be given to the jury for 
its consideration. Failure to give the instruction under these 
facts amounted to an abuse of discretion and prejudiced the 
defendant. Accordingly/ the conviction of Mr. Bruce should be 
reversed and the case remanded back to the trial court for new trial 
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CONCLUSION 
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, the Appellant, 
Henry Bruce, requests that this Court reverse his conviction for 
aggravated robbery and remand this case to the trial with an order 
for either dismissal of the charges of a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this /ti day of April, 1987. 
Ay J- &<<?<-. / \ • /^Qi 
DEBRA K. LOY /f 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 




76-6-302. Aggravated robbery.—(1) A person commits aggravated 
robbery if in the course of committing robbery, he: 
(a) Uses a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm, knife or a facsimile of a 
knife or a deadly weapon; or 
(b) Causes serious bodily injury upon another. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a felony of the first degree. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be deemed to be "in the 
course of committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, dur-
ing the commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or 
commission of a robbery. 
ADDENDUM B 
Kule 609. Impeachment by evidence of conviction of 
crime. 
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, 
evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited 
from him or established by public record during cross-examination but only if 
the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year 
under the law under which he was convicted, and the court determines that 
the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect 
to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of 
the punishment. 
(b) Time limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if 
a period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or 
of the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, 
whichever is the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests of 
justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts 
and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. However, 
evidence of a conviction more than ten years old as calculated herein, is not 
admissible unless the proponent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance 
written notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse party with 
a fair opportunity to contest the use of such evidence. 
(c) Effect of pardon, annulment, or certificate of rehabilitation. Evi-
dence of a conviction is not admissible under this rule if (1) the conviction has 
been the subject of a pardon, annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or other 
equivalent procedure based on a finding of the rehabilitation of the person 
convicted, and that person has not been convicted of a subsequent crime which 
was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, or (2) the 
conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, or other equivalent 
procedure based on a finding of innocence. 
(d) Juvenile adjudications. Evidence of juvenile adjudications is gener-
ally not admissible under this rule. The court may, however, in a criminal 
case allow evidence of a juvenile adjudication of a witness other than the 
accused if conviction of the offense would be admissible to attack the credibil-
ity of an adult and the court is satisfied that admission in evidence is neces-
sary for a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence. 
(e) Pendency of appeal. The pendency of an appeal therefrom does not 
render evidence of a conviction inadmissible. Evidence of the pendency of an 
appeal is admissible. 
ADDENDUM C 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
One of the most important issues in this case is the 
identification of the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime. 
The State has the burden of proving identity, beyond a reasonable 
doubt. It is not essential that the witness himself be free frcoi 
doubt as to the correctness of his or her statement. However, you 
che jury, must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the 
accuracy of the identification of the defendant before you may 
convict him. If you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant was the person who committed the crime, you mu?: 
find the defendant not guilty. 
Identification testimony is an expression of belief or 
impression by the witness. Its value depends on the opportunity 
the witness had to observe the offender at the time of the off^rse 
and to make a reliable identification later. 
In appraising the identification testimony of a witness, 
you should consider the following: 
(1) Are you convinced that the witness has the capacity 
and an adequate opportunity to observe the offender? 
Whether the witness had an adequate opportunity to observe 
the offender at the time of the offense will be affected by such 
matters as how long or short a time was available, how far or 
» 
close the witness was, how good were lighting conditions, whethar 
the witness had had occasion to see or know the parson in the 
past. 
(2) Are you satisfied that: the identification made by uhe 
witness subsequent to the offense was the product of his own 
recollection? You may take into account both the strength of 
the identification and the circumstances under which the identificat 
was made. 
If the identification by the witness may have been 
influenced by the circumstances under which the defendant was 
presented to him for identification, you should scrutinize the 
identification with great care. You may also consider the length 
of time that lapsed between the occurence of the crime and the 
next opportunity of the witness to see the defendant, as a factor 
bearing on the reliability of the identification. 
You may also take into account that identification made 
by picking the defendant out of group of similar individuals is 
generally more reliable than one which results from the presentation 
nf the defendant alone to the witness. 
(3) You may take into account any occasion in which the 
witness failed to make an identification of the defendant, or made 
an identification that was inconsistent with his identification 
at trial. 
(4) Finally, you must consider the credibility of each 
identification witness in the same way as any other witness, 
consider whether he is truthful, and consider whether he had the 
capacity and opportunity to make a reliable observation on the 
matter covered in his testimony. 
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I again emphasize that the burden of proof of the 
•osecutor extends to every element of the crime charged, and this 
lecifically includes the burden of proving beyond a reasonable 
ubt the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime 
th which he stands charged. If, after examining the testimony, 
u have a reasonable doubt as to the accuracy of the identification, 
u must find the defendant not guilty. 
INSTRUCTION Vs. 
One of the important issues in this case is the idonti£-.cati^ 
of the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime. The Stace has 
the burden of proving identity, beyond a reasonable doubt.. It is 
not essential that the witness himself be free from doubt as to the 
correctness of his or her statement. However, you the jury, must 
be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the accuracy of the 
identification of the defendant before you may convict him. In 
appraising the identification testimony of the witnesses you should 
consider the following: 
(a) Did the witnesses have the capacity and opportunity 
to observe the offender. 
(b) Is the identification made by the witness a product 
of his or her own recollection or knowledge. 
(c) Have the witnesses been consistent in recognizing 
the defendant as a participant in the offense. 
If .after considering these factors you have a reasonable 
doubt as to the accuracy of the identification, you must find the 
defendant not guilty. 
